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Abstract
This paper characterizes the equilibrium in a continuous time financial market
populated by heterogeneous agents who differ in their rate of relative risk aversion and
face convex portfolio constraints. The model is studied in an application to margin
constraints and found to match real world observations about financial variables and
leverage cycles. It is shown how margin constraints increase the market price of risk
and decrease the interest rate by forcing more risk averse agents to hold more risky
assets, producing a higher equity risk premium. In addition, heterogeneity and margin
constraints are shown to produce both pro- and counter-cyclical leverage cycles. Be-
yond two types, it is shown how constraints can cascade and how leverage can exhibit
highly non-linear dynamics. Finally, empirical results are given, documenting a novel
stylized fact which is predicted by the model, namely that the leverage cycle is both
pro- and counter-cyclical.
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Introduction
Market incompleteness and individual heterogeneity are two important characteristics of
financial markets. Many markets exhibit incompleteness, in the sense that one cannot freely
choose their portfolio choices either because of constraints imposed by lenders, because of
regulatory constraints, or simply because of a true incompleteness in the market. At the
same time, in order to generate trade among individuals they must differ in some form. If
all agents were identical then market prices would make them indifferent to their portfolio
holdings and there would never be any trade. This paper seeks to combine these two facts
about financial markets by combining portfolio constraints and preference heterogeneity,
with a particular application to margin constraints.
Margin constraints increase the market price of risk and decrease the interest rate, con-
tributing to a higher equity risk premium. The interest rate is low because the constraint
limits the supply of risk free bonds to the market. This limit in supply pushes up the bond
price and down the interest rate. On the other hand, the market price of risk is high be-
cause constrained agents are unable to leverage up to take advantage of high returns. On
the opposite side of this constraint are risk averse agents who would like to sell their risky
assets to reduce the volatility of their consumption. They are unable to do so, given the
counter-party is the constrained agent. Thus margin constraints create an implicit liquidity
constraint which allows the market price of risk to remain high in order to compensate risk
averse agents for having a riskier consumption stream.
Asset prices are higher or lower than in an unconstrained equilibrium depending on
whether the income effect or the substitution effect dominates. When agents are constrained,
other agents are forced to hold more risky assets. These unconstrained agents hold both risky
and risk-free assets, implying that an increase in the market price of risk and a decrease in the
risk-free rate represent an ambiguous change in the investment opportunity set. However, the
effect tends to increase the equity risk premium. This has the effect of increasing the discount
rate and simultaneously makes agents wealthier today and makes consumption tomorrow less
expensive. The first effect (an income effect) causes agents to desire to consume more today.
The second effect (a substitution effect) causes agents to desire to consume less today and
more tomorrow. Which effect dominates depends on the EIS of unconstrained agents. If
EIS is less than one then the substitution effect dominates: individuals consume less today,
pushing up their wealth and thus increasing asset prices. If EIS is greater than one then the
income effect dominates: individuals consume more today, pushing down their wealth and
thus reducing asset prices. In this way we can see either an increase or a decrease in asset
prices when some portion of agents are constrained, depending on whether the EIS is greater
1
or less than one.
Margin constraints and preference heterogeneity generate both pro- and counter-cyclical
leverage cycles. Less risk averse agents dominate the economy and the price of risky assets
is high when aggregate production is high. High asset prices increase individual wealth and
reduce leverage. On the contrary, risk averse agents dominate when aggregate production is
low, reducing asset prices. Low asset prices cause individual wealth to be low and individual
leverage to be high. With the introduction of a margin constraint less risk averse agents
eventually run into a borrowing limit. Not only is borrowing reduced, but, as discussed
before, asset prices can be higher under constraint. In turn, total leverage falls. In this way
heterogeneous preferences and margin constraints produce both pro- and counter-cyclical
leverage cycles.
Financial leverage has become an important policy variable since the crisis of 2007-
2008. In particular leverage allows investors to increase the volatility of balance sheet equity,
producing the possibility of greater returns. At the same time leveraged investors are exposed
to larger down-side risk. In the face of negative shocks, constrained investors must sell
assets to reduce their leverage. This is known as the ”leverage cycle”. The associated credit
contraction produces large volatility in asset prices and has been the target of regulation in
the post-crisis era (e.g. the Basel III capital requirement rules). However, leverage cyclicality
remains a topic of debate. Leverage cyclicality is both pro- and counter- cyclical in the model
presented here, depending on the aggregate state of the economy and the marginal agent. In
section 4 I document in the data that cycles are both pro- and counter-cyclical depending on
the level of aggregate asset pricing variables which can be interpreted as proxies for marginal
preferences. This fact could reconcile some of the empirical debates about the cyclicality of
leverage and re-enforces the study of preference heterogeneity as a driver of financial trade.
Convex portfolio constraints arise quite naturally in finance. A convex constraint simply
states that the portfolio weights must lie in a convex set containing zero (see Stiglitz and
Weiss (1981) for an example of micro-foundations to credit constraints). In macroeconomics
there are countless examples of particular models with market incompleteness which can
be described in this setting of convex constraints, such as Aiyagari (1994); Kiyotaki and
Moore (1997); Krusell and Smith (1998); Bernanke et al. (1999) and many others. A margin
constraint essentially states that an agent cannot borrow infinitely against their equity.
This type of constraint is seen in consumer finance when borrowing money to purchase
a home: one must almost always put up a down payment. In financial markets margin
constraints arise in repo markets and other lending vehicles (see Hardouvelis and Peristiani
(1992); Hardouvelis and Theodossiou (2002); Adrian and Shin (2010a) for empirical studies
of margins). In fact real world experience motivated the theoretical study of leverage cycles
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initiated by Geanakoplos (1996). In addition limits to arbitrage and financial bubbles have
been studied under margin constraints in the context of liquidity (see e.g. Brunnermeier and
Pedersen (2009)). Many of these phenomena arise in the model presented in this paper, but
the predictions for leverage cycles are emphasized because of their novelty.
In theoretical models leverage cyclicality depends greatly on the underlying assumptions
producing trade. In his foundational work on the topic, Geanakoplos (1996) shows how the
combination of belief heterogeneity and margin constraints produce a pro-cyclical leverage
cycle. However, this finding is in opposition to the contemporary paper by Kiyotaki and
Moore (1997), where participation constraints force agents to invest through intermediaries,
whose credit constraints produce a counter-cyclical leverage cycle. More recently He and
Krishnamurthy (2013) and Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2014) also produce counter-cyclical
leverage cycles by including intermediaries through whom constrained agents can profit from
risky assets. In fact, He and Krishnamurthy (2013) even points out the debate in the applied
literature and the fact that, ”[Their] model does not capture the other aspects of this process,
... that some parts of the financial sector reduce asset holdings and deleverage.” These models
imply that the mechanism producing trade determines leverage’s cyclicality.
The empirical literature has noted this ambiguity over the cyclicality of leverage in differ-
ent. Korajczyk and Levy (2003) study the capital structure of firms and find that leverage
is counter-cyclical for unconstrained firms and pro-cyclical for constrained firms. However,
Halling et al. (2016) contradict this by showing that target leverage is counter-cyclical once
you account for variation in explanatory variables, pointing out that the effect in Korajczyk
and Levy (2003) is only the ”direct effect”. In the cross section of the economy Adrian and
Shin (2010b) find that leverage is counter-cyclical for households, ambiguous for non-financial
firms, and pro-cyclical for broker dealers. However, the authors study the relationship be-
tween leverage and changes in balance sheet assets. This comparison produces a mechanical
correlation which somewhat disappears when assets are replaced by GDP growth as a proxy
for the business cycle (see Figure 13). Ang et al. (2011) point out that when accounting for
prices broker dealer leverage is counter-cyclical, but that hedge fund leverage is pro-cyclical.
These contrary studies can be reconciled when controlling for financial variables such as the
price/dividend ratio or the interest rate. In fact, for several sectors studied (see section 4)
the leverage cycle is both pro- and counter-cyclical. This ambiguity is predicted by the model
of preference heterogeneity and margin constraints presented here.
Many authors have criticized the assumption of a representative, constant relative risk
aversion agent since Mehra and Prescott (1985) posited the equity risk premium puzzle. The
definition of new utility functions was the first major response to this puzzle, in particular
Epstein-Zin preferences (Epstein and Zin (1989); Weil (1989)) and habit formation (Campbell
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and Cochrane (1999)) have been used to explain the equity premium puzzle. However, several
papers have studied preferences across individuals and found them to be heterogeneous and
constant in time (Brunnermeier and Nagel (2008); Chiappori and Paiella (2011); Chiappori
et al. (2012)), contradicting both of these new branches of the theoretical literature. In
addition, Epstein et al. (2014) pointed out that the assumptions necessary to match the risk
premium using Epstein-Zin preferences produce unrealistic preference for early resolution of
uncertainty. Beyond these criticisms, one needs heterogeneity in order to generate trade at
all in any market model. In a representative agent setting one looks for the prices which
make the agent indifferent to not trading. Risk preference heterogeneity has succeeded in
partially responding to these issues.
Heterogeneity in risk preferences has been used to generate trade in financial models since
the foundational paper of Dumas (1989). Since then many authors have studied the prob-
lem from different angles, assuming different levels of market completeness, utility functions,
participation constraints, information structures, etc., but almost always under the assump-
tion of only two preference types (Basak and Cuoco (1998); Coen-Pirani (2004); Guvenen
(2006); Kogan et al. (2007); Guvenen (2009); Cozzi (2011); Garleanu and Pedersen (2011);
Hugonnier (2012); Rytchkov (2014); Longstaff and Wang (2012); Prieto (2010); Christensen
et al. (2012); Bhamra and Uppal (2014); Chabakauri (2013, 2015); Gaˆrleanu and Panageas
(2015); Santos and Veronesi (2010)). Cvitanic´ et al. (2011) studies the problem of N agents
with several dimensions of heterogeneity and focuses on the dominant agents, characterizing
portfolios via the Malliavan calculus. Abbot (2017) studies a setting with N heterogeneous
CRRA agents in a complete financial market using a value function approach and shows
how changes in the number of types can produce substantially different quantitative results
and how the variance in preferences provides an additional degree of freedom for explaining
the equity risk premium puzzle. However, that work produces large amounts of aggregate
leverage and high individual margins. This observation points towards the need to introduce
some degree of constraint or incompleteness to better match the real world. To that end,
this paper studies the same type of economy with N heterogeneous CRRA agents under
convex portfolio constraints with an application to margin constraints.
A fundamental paper by Cvitanic´ and Karatzas (1992) studied the general case of con-
vex portfolio constraints in partial equilibrium. The authors developed an ingenious way to
embed the agent in a series of fictitious economies, parameterized via a sort of Kuhn-Tucker
condition, and then to select the appropriate market to make the agent just indifferent.
However, their approach was to use convex duality to characterize the solution, which re-
lies on a strict assumption that the relative risk aversion be bounded above by one. This
limitation led others to look to solve the primal problem directly, such as He and Pages
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(1993); Cuoco and He (1994); Cuoco (1997); Karatzas et al. (2003). These works use dense
and complex mathematical techniques which may or may not provide tractable solutions for
calculation. The present paper takes a more direct approach to solve the primal problem by
noticing that homogeneous preferences are associated to a value function which factors into
a function of wealth and a function of the aggregate state, under the appropriate ansatz.
Using this ansatz, the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation becomes a PDE over consumption
weights.
1. A Model of Preference Heterogeneity
1.1. Financial Markets
Consider a continuous time, infinite horizon Lucas (1978) economy with one consumption
good. This consumption good, denoted Dt, is produced by a tree whose dividend follows a
geometric Brownian motion (GBM):
dDt
Dt
= µDdt+ σDdWt
where Wt is a standard Brownian motion and (µD, σD) are constants. Agents can trade in
a (locally) risk-free and a risky security, whose prices are denoted S0t and St respectively.
These prices are assumed to follow an exponential and an Itoˆ process, respectively:
dSt
St
= µtdt+ σtdWt (1)
dS0t
S0t
= rtdt (2)
where (µt, σt, rt) are determined in equilibrium. Individuals are initially endowed with a
share in the per-capita tree, αi0, and a position in the risk-free asset, βi0.
1.2. Preferences and Wealth
The economy is populated by an arbitrary number N of atomistic agents indexed by
i ∈ {1, . . . , N}. Agents have constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) preferences and differ
in their rate of relative risk aversion, γi, such that their instantaneous utility is given by
ui(c) =
c1−γi
1− γi
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Denote by Xit an individual’s wealth at time t and note that initial wealth is given by
Xi0 = αi0S0 + βi0S
0
t . Denote by piit the share of an individual’s wealth invested in the
risky stock, which implies 1− piit is the share invested in the bond. Assuming that trading
strategies are self financing, an individual’s wealth evolves as
dXit =
[
Xit
(
rt + piit
(
µt +
Dt
St
− rt
))
− cit
]
dt+XitpiitσtdWt
1.3. Portfolio Constraints and Individual Optimization
Individual investors solve a utility maximization problem subject to their self-financing
budget constraint and a portfolio constraint:
max
{cit,piit}∞t=0
E
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt
c1−γiit
1− γidt
s.t. dXit =
[
Xit
(
rt + piit
(
µt +
Dt
St
− rt
))
− cit
]
dt+XitpiitσtdWt
piit ∈ Πi
where Πi ⊆ R represents a closed, convex region of the portfolio space which contains
{0}. For example Πi = R is the unconstrained case, Πi = R+ is a short sale constraint,
Πi = {pi : pi ≤ mi | mi ≥ 0} is a margin constraint. This set is allowed to differ across agents,
as implied by the subscript. This paper focuses on an application to margin constraints, but
the approach is applicable to any constraint which can be written as a function of the
aggregate state.
1.4. Equilibrium
Investors are considered to be atomistic and thus I consider a Radner (1972) type equi-
librium.
Definition 1. An equilibrium in this economy is defined by a set of processes
{rt, St, {cit, Xit, piit}Ni=1} ∀ t, given preferences and initial endowments, such that {cit, Xit, piit}
solve the agents’ individual optimization problems and the following set of market clearing
conditions is satisfied:∑
i
cit = Dt ,
∑
i
(1− piit)Xit = 0 ,
∑
i
piitXit = St (3)
I study Markovian equilibria such that equilibrium quantities can be written as functions of
some state vector. That is for some equilibrium process Yt, I look for functions f(·) such
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that Yt = f(zt) for some process zt. I will look for a particular equilibrium in the vector of
consumption weights defined by
ω = [ω1t, . . . , ω(N−1)t]T = [c1t/Dt, . . . , c(N−1)t/Dt]T
This is in the spirit of Chabakauri (2013, 2015), where given two agents we can take the con-
sumption weight of a single agent as the state variable. I’ve only included N−1 consumption
weights because the last is determined by market clearing. However, for some equations the
full vector of weights is useful, so I will define
Ω = [ω1t, . . . , ωNt]
T = [c1t/Dt, . . . , cNt/Dt]
T
The following section will describe how to characterize equilibrium processes in terms of
these quantities.
2. Equilibrium Characterization
To solve this problem I begin with the approach of Cvitanic´ and Karatzas (1992). This
method uses a fictitious, unconstrained economy and a shadow cost of constraint, or Lagrange
multiplier, to find the correct pricing process. Unlike in their work I do not use a duality
approach, but show how the primal problem admits a Markov representative. The reason
this works is because when preferences are homothetic they can be represented by a utility
function which is homogeneous of some degree. In this case the value function factors and
the resulting ODE is no longer a function of individual wealth. This approach will likewise
work for any homogeneous utility function, including Epstein-Zin1. This process will be
described in the following subsections.
1In particular, first order conditions from a dynamic program give consumption as c = u′−1 (∂XJ(X,Y )),
where Y is any arbitrary, aggregate state vector and X an individual’s wealth. We would like to find
c = X/V (Y ). Equate these and rearrange to find ∂XJ(X,Y ) = u
′(X/V (Y )). When the utility function is
homogeneous of degree k + 1, u′(·) is homogeneous of degree k. Thus ∂XJ(X,Y ) = u′(1)V (Y )−kXk. By
integrating with respect to X one finds a proposal for the value function such that consumption is a linear
function of wealth.
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Πi δi(ν) Ni
Unconstrained R 0 0
Margin Constraint {pi : pi ≤ mi;mi ≥ 0} −νmi R−
Short-Sale Constraint {pi : pi ≥ si; si ≤ 0} −νsi R+
Table 1: Examples of constraint sets, support functions, and effective domain of the adjust-
ment νi.
2.1. Optimality in Fictitious Unconstrained Economy
In order to find the constrained equilibrium, we define new processes for individual prices,
which are ”adjusted” by a process νit, considered the shadow cost of constraint:
dS0it
S0it
= (rt + δi(νit))dt
dSit
Sit
= (µt + νit + δi(νit))dt+ σtdWt
The function δi(·) is the support function of Πi, which is defined as
δi(ν) = sup
pi∈Πi
(−νpi)
In addition, this gives rise to the effective domain of νit defined by Ni = {ν ∈ R : δi(ν) <∞}
(for examples see Table 1). Finally, we have a complimentary slackness condition which
states νitpiit + δi(νit) = 0. Each agent solves their optimization problem in the face of their
individual, fictitious financial market.
Define the stochastic discount factor (SDF) of an individual agent as an Itoˆ process which
evolves as a function of the individual’s adjustment:
dHit
Hit
= −(rt + δi(νit))dt−
(
θt +
νit
σt
)
dWt (4)
By a straight-forward application of the martingale approach (Karatzas et al. (1987)) in this
fictitious economy one finds individual consumption as a function of individual SDF’s:
cit =
(
Λie
ρtHit
)− 1
γi (5)
for all i, where Λi is the Lagrange multiplier associated to the static budget constraint. In the
case where Πi = R ∀ i, the SDF’s coincide and the ratios of marginal utilities are constant.
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However, when agents are constrained in their portfolio choice this is not the case and we
have
c−γiit
c
−γj
jt
=
ΛiHit
ΛjHjt
These ratios of SDF’s, which are proportional to ratios of marginal utilities, are very familiar
in the theory of incomplete market equilibria. In Cuoco et al. (2001), a representative agent
with state dependent preferences is studied, where the preferences are a weighted average
of individual preferences. The stochastic weights are exactly equal to the ratio of marginal
utilities. This is also seen in Basak and Cuoco (1998) and Hugonnier (2012).
2.2. General Equilibrium Characterization
Equilibrium is characterized by first assuming the existence of a Markovian equilibrium,
deriving a system of ODE’s for wealth-consumptions ratios, then recovering the adjustments
νit using the complimentary slackness conditions. Given this it is possible to prove optimality
of the value functions2. First, consider the interest rate and market price of risk:
Proposition 1. The interest rate and market price of risk can be shown to be functions of
weighted averages of individuals’ consumption weights, preference parameters, and adjust-
ments such that
θt =
1∑
i
ωit
γi
(
σD − 1
σt
∑
i
ωitνit
γi
)
(6)
rt =
1∑
i
ωit
γi
(
µD + ρ
∑
i
ωit
γi
−
∑
i
ωit
γi
δi(νit) (7)
−1
2
∑
i
1 + γi
γ2i
(
θt +
νit
σt
)2
ωit
)
(8)
The interest rate and market price of risk take a typical form, but are augmented by
the adjustment to individuals’ marginal utilities. First notice that the market price of risk
(Eq. (6)) is determined by the fundamental volatility σD divided by the weighted average of
elasticity of intertemporal substitution (EIS), exactly as in complete markets (Abbot (2017)).
In addition the constraint will either increase or reduce the market price of risk, depending
on the domain of νit. In the case of margin constraints νit ≤ 0, so the market price of risk
will be weakly higher under constraint. This is driven by an implicitt liquidity constraint.
2This remains a claim at this point. The proof is ongoing.
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Constrained agents are unable to take advantage of high returns. In addition, the effect of
volatility implies that in times when stock price volatility is low, greater constraint implies
greater returns. This correlation is again driven by the fact that agents cannot borrow to
take advantage of the returns, producing the same type of liquidity effect described in the
limits-to-arbitrage literature (e.g. Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) or Hugonnier (2012)).
Risk neutral agents would arbitrage away the high returns, but cannot because of their
margin constraint.
The interest rate similarly exhibits a familiar shape. We see a rate of time preference
term, an intertemporal smoothing term, and a prudence or risk preference term:
rt = ρ︸︷︷︸
Rate of Time Preference
+
µD −
∑
i
ωit
γi
δi(νit)∑
i
ωit
γi︸ ︷︷ ︸
Intertemporal Smoothing
− 1
2
∑
i
1+γi
γ2i
(
θt +
νit
σt
)2
ωit∑
i
ωit
γi︸ ︷︷ ︸
Prudence/Risk Preferences
Both the intertemporal smoothing and prudence terms are augmented by the constraint.
Under a homogeneous margin constraint, δi(νit) = −mνit, but recall that νit ≤ 0, which to-
gether imply that the constraint reduces interest rates through the intertemporal smoothing
term. Constrained agents are unable to supply bonds to the market in order to transfer con-
sumption and wealth from the future to today. A lower supply of bonds pushes up the price
and down the interest rate. At the same time constraint affects the interest rate through the
prudence motive by changing the demand for precautionary savings. Individuals demand
more precautionary savings when their SDF is more volatile (Kimball (1990)). When agents
are constrained, their SDF is less volatile as they are unable to increase their exposure to
fundamental risk. Ceterus paribus, this reduces the demand for precautionary savings and
increases the interest rate, counteracting the intertemporal motive. Together these forces
produce an equity risk premium which depends on the shape of heterogeneity, the degree of
constraint, and the state variable, all driven by the individual consumption weights which
determine the marginal agents.
How consumption weights evolve over time is important not only from an economic
perspective, but also in order to derive the solution of the model. We can study the dynamics
of consumption weights by applying Itoˆ’s lemma and matching coefficients to find their drift
and diffusion:
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Proposition 2. Consumption weights follow an Itoˆ process whose dynamics are given by:
dωit
ωit
= µωitdt+ σωitdWt
where
µωit =
1
γi
(
rt + δi(νit)− ρ+ 1
2
1 + γi
γi
(
θt +
νit
σt
)2
− σD
(
θt +
νit
σt
))
+ σ2D − µD (9)
σωit =
1
γi
(
θt +
νit
σt
)
− σD (10)
This implies that the state variable ω follows an Itoˆ process such that
dω = µωdt+ σωdWt (11)
where µω = [µω1tω1t, . . . , µω(N−1)t]T and σω = [σω1tω1t, . . . , σω(N−1)t]T
These equations are very similar to those one finds in the complete markets case (Abbot
(2017)), but augmented by the constraint. In particular, consider the volatility of consump-
tion weights given in Eq. (10). An agent’s consumption volatility is exactly zero when their
preference parameter satisfies
γi =
1
ξt
− Ξt
ξt
1
σD
+
νit
σDσt
where ξt =
∑
i
ωit
γi
, Ξt =
∑
i
ωitνit
γi
We can think of this as the marginal preference level in the market for consumption. However,
it is possible that this preference level is not unique. Consider the case where some agents
face a margin constraint, but others do not. Amongst the unconstrained agents, the marginal
preference level corresponds to the first two terms, while among the constrained agents all
of the terms matter. Given νit ≤ 0 under margin constraints, there could very well exist
both a constrained and an unconstrained agent who have zero consumption volatility. This
is driven by the constrained agents being unable to leverage up to gain more exposure to
aggregate risk.
Since θt and rt are functions of {ωit}Ni=1, it remains to show that {νit}Ni=1 are as well. First,
one can derive a system of PDE’s for individual wealth/consumption ratios, from which one
can determine the adjustments.
Proposition 3. Given Propostions 1 and 2 and assuming adjustments and volatility are
functions of ω such that νi(ω) = νit and σ(ω) = σt, it is possible to define the interest rate
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and market price of risk as functions of ω such that rt = r(ω) and θt = θ(ω). Assuming there
exists a Markovian equilibrium in ω, the individuals’ wealth-consumption ratios, Vi(ω) =
Xit/cit, satisfy PDE’s given for each i by
1
γi
[
(1− γi)(r(ω) + δi(νi(ω)))− ρ+ 1− γi
2γi
(
θ(ω) +
νi(ω)
σ(ω)
)2]
Vi(ω)+[
1− γi
γi
(
θ(ω) +
νi(ω)
σ(ω)
)
σTω + µ
T
ω
]
∇Vi(ω) + 1
2
σTωHVi(ω)σω + 1 = 0
(12)
where ∇ and Hω represent the gradient and hessian operators, and where µω and σω are
given in Proposition 2.
Boundary conditions when a single agent dominates are given by the autarkical case, where
lim
ωi→1
Vj(ω) =
γj
ρ− (1− γj)
(
(θ(ω)+νi(ω)/σ(ω))
2
2γj
+ r(ω) + δj(νj(ω))
)
(13)
Boundary conditions when an agent’s weight goes to zero are given by the solution to an
N − 1 agent problem.
The boundary conditions when a single agent dominates represent the vertices of the state
space. On the other hand, when an agent’s weight goes to zero, the economy solution is
equivalent to a two agent economy, with the zero agent’s wealth/consumption ratio still
satisfying Eq. (12), but their choices having no effect on aggregate variables. These partial
differential equations represent the shape of individuals’ wealth/consumption ratios over the
state space. Unlike in complete markets, however, the system is highly non-linear, since the
coefficients depend in a complicated way on the solution itself.
Next, consider the portfolios of individuals, given in Proposition 4.
Proposition 4. Assuming adjustments and volatility can be written as functions of ω such
that νi(ω) = νit and σ(ω) = σt, it can be shown that portfolios are functions of ω such that
pii(ω) = piit, where
pii(ω) =
1
γiσ(ω)
(
θ(ω) +
νi(ω)
σ(ω)
+ γi
σω(ω)
T∇V (ω)
Vi(ω)
)
(14)
where σω(ω) = [σωi(ω)ωi]
T
i is the vector of diffusions of ω.
One can see right away that portfolios take the typical ICAPM form (Merton (1971)). There
is first a myopic term, represented by the market price of risk scaled down by risk aversion and
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volatility, which gives the instantaneous portfolio demand of an individual given the market
price of risk. Next is a hedging term, determined by the co-movement of an individual’s
wealth with the aggregate state. Finally, there is a constraint term, which compensates the
individual’s portfolio such that they are within the constraint set.
On an aggregate level, we can derive asset pricing variables from an application of Itoˆ’s
lemma and from market clearing for wealth.
Proposition 5. Assuming adjustments can be written as functions of ω such that νi(ω) =
νit, it can be shown that volatility and the price dividend ratio are functions of ω such that
σ(ω) = σt and S(ω) = St/Dt, where
σ(ω) = σD +
σω(ω)
T
(∇V (ω) + JV (ω)TΩ)
S(ω) (15)
where JV (ω) represents the Jacobian matrix and where
S(ω) =
∑
i
ωiVi(ω) (16)
represents the price dividend ratio St/Dt.
Volatility in Eq. (15) is driven by the fundamental volatility, the shape of wealth con-
sumption ratios, and the volatility of consumption weights. When agents have high volatility
in consumption weights, the volatility of asset prices will be higher. At the same time, in-
dividuals’ wealth will be less volatile under constraint. This will produce a reduction in
volatility. We will see these two forces in the numerical simulations in section 3.
We need to derive an expression for {νit}Ni=1 in order to close the model. The functional
form depends on the type of constraint. To that end, I will focus from here only on margin
constraints. The following proposition gives the functional form for the adjustments under
homogeneous margin constraints when piit ≤ m for all i, where m ≥ 0, which implies an
effective domain of Ni = {ν : ν ≤ 0} and a support function of δi(ν) = −mν.
Proposition 6. Under margin constraints, adjustments can be written as functions of ω
such that νi(ω) = νit, where
νi(ω) = min
{
0;mγiσ(ω)
2
(
1− 1
mσ(ω)
(
θ(ω)
γi
+
σω(ω)
T∇V (ω)
Vi(ω)
))}
(17)
Finally, we need a verification argument for optimality of the value functions. In partic-
ular, we would like to be sure that solution to the PDE’s in Proposition 3 are indeed the
wealth/consumption ratios associated to the individuals optimal choices. If we are willing
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to make the assumption that the wealth/consumption ratios are twice continuously differ-
entiable, then we can easily show using Itoˆ’s lemma that the value functions are indeed
optimal (this proceeds as in Chabakauri (2015)). However, it would be preferable to relax
this assumption. To do so we can make use of a powerful new result in Confortola et al.
(2017), namely that under certain conditions the value function implied by Proposition 3 is
indeed optimal3.
Claim 1. Assuming that individual wealth/consumption ratios Vi(ω) are C
1 with bounded
first derivative, then there exists a unique solution to Eq. (12) (in the viscosity sense) and
this solution corresponds to the value functions in Eq. (22). Furthermore this represents a
Markovian equilibrium satisfied by Propostions 1 to 6.
This claim relies only on a single degree of differentiability4.
3. Numerical Solution
This section presents numerical results for several assumptions about the distribution of
preferences. First, the case of two types is evaluated and the cyclicality of the leverage cycle
is emphasized. The leverage cycle is pro- or counter-cyclical depending on the marginal
agent. Second, results are presented for three agents. Two key features which are not
observed in the two agent case are the possibility of cascading constraints and a highly
non-monotonic leverage. When one agent is constrained, other agents tend to hold more
leverage. This pushes the intermediate agent closer to their own constraint. At the same
time, this increase in individual leverage can partially or even fully offset the reduction in
total leverage generated by the first agent’s constraint. Over all simulations I hold fixed
(µD, σD, ρ) = (0.01, 0.032, 0.02), chosen to compare to Chabakauri (2015).
3.1. Two Types and Leverage Cycles
Consider the case of two agents5 with relative risk aversion (γ1, γ2) = (1.1, 5.0) who face
a margin constraint such that the share, piit, of their wealth invested in the risky asset is less
3This is left as a claim, as only an outline of a proof has been completed.
4I believe this condition can be relaxed to simply Lipschitz continuity.
5The two agent model represents the boundary of the three agent problem, so is its solution is necessary
to treat the three agent case. In addition, understanding the shape of functions in this simple case will help
to fix ideas in the more complex case of arbitrary number of types.
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than some constant mi. This is equivalent to a leverage constraint:
piit ≤ mi ⇔ αitSt
αitSt + bitS0t
≤ mi ⇔ 1
1 +
bitS0t
αitSt
≤ mi ⇔ −bitS
0
t
αitSt
≤ mi − 1
mi
In particular, take mi = m = 1.2.
There will exist a region of the state space over which this constraint binds for the less
risk-averse agent. In this region, the more risk averse agent holds a larger share of their
wealth in the risky asset. In order to achieve these portfolio weights, the constrained agent
holds fewer risky shares and the unconstrained agent holds more risky shares. By reducing
their risky shares, the less risk-averse agent’s constraint actually tightens, causing them to
sell more risky-shares, making the effect more than proportional. This corresponds to a
substantial decline in leverage and a tightening of credit demand, pushing down the interest
rate. In addition, the market price of risk is high in order to compensate the risk averse
investor for holding a larger share. Whether these two effects combine to make asset prices
higher or lower depends on whether the income or wealth effect dominates.
Portfolios are represented in Figure 1(a). Moving form right to left in the state space,
agent 1, the least risk averse agent would prefer to leverage up, but runs into their constraint.
In order remain below their constraint they adjust the composition of their wealth. The
portfolio weight is falling in risk free borrowing, so the agent reduces their risk free borrowing.
This reduction in the supply of risk free assets pushes up the price and down the interest rate,
as is seen in Figure 2(a). But how does the agent finance a reduction in their borrowing?
They shift their wealth out of risky shares and into risk-free savings. When the agent is a
borrower the portfolio weight is decreasing in risky shares, so this actually can only partially
alleviate their situation. The constrained agent must further reduce their borrowing. As
seen in Figures 1(c) and 1(d), there is a substantial fall in borrowing and leverage as this
agent shifts out of risky assets and into risk-free assets.
The market price of risk must be higher to compensate the unconstrained agent for
holding more risky assets. As previously mentioned, the constrained agent is selling risky
assets to the unconstrained agent, who is more risk averse. This agent requires higher returns
on the risky asset and so the market price of risk is higher (Figure 2(b)). The combination
of a lower interest rate and higher market price of risk produces an ambiguous effect on the
risky asset price.
To discuss asset prices we need to consider how individual preferences translate into
choices about consumption given changes in the investment opportunity set. Given an im-
provement in the investment opportunity set, an agent will always have a substitution effect
which reduces consumption today, as they substitute consumption from today to tomorrow.
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Fig. 1.
On the other hand, the agent is richer today and gets income from their wealth, implying
an income effect. This income effect pushes up consumption in all periods. The interaction
of these two forces determine the level of consumption today, which in turn determines the
wealth/consumption ratio and asset price.
Given an improvement in the investment opportunity set, the price of the risky asset
increases or decreases depending on whether the income or substitution effect dominates.
When an agent has RRA of one, or EIS of one, their income and substitution effects perfectly
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Fig. 2.
offset. When EIS is less than one the income effect dominates and the agent chooses to
increase consumption today. Thus, relative to wealth, their consumption is greater, implying
a lower wealth/consumption ratio. This reduces asset prices which are a weighted average of
wealth/consumption ratios. When EIS is greater than one the substitution effect dominates.
Wealth/consumption ratios rise and the asset price increases.
In the present setting, both agents have low EIS, so we expect that for a given improve-
ment/deterioration in the investment opportunity set, asset prices will be lower/higher.
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Figures 2(c) and 2(d) show that over part of the state space the asset price is indeed higher
under constraint. Although the market price of risk is higher, the risk free rate is lower and
the constraint shifts more weight to agents who are net lenders. Thus the effect on the risk-
free rate dominates and the investment opportunity set deteriorates and, since the income
effect dominates, the asset price rises. However, in the lower area of the state space the asset
price is lower than in the absence of constraint. This is driven by the fact that the change in
the investment opportunity is not unambiguously negative. The unconstrained agent holds
both risky and risk-free assets, and the return on risk-free assets has fallen. To see how the
relative returns on these two assets changes we can look at the equity risk premium
ERPt = µt +
Dt
St
− rt = θtσt
The equity risk premium is the expected capital gains plus dividend yield minus the risk free
rate, which is simply the market price of risk times volatility. In Figure 3(c) we see that the
asset price is lower or higher under constraint exactly when the equity risk premium is lower
or higher. This is because the unconstrained agent is a net lender, so is essentially short
the equity risk premium. Any improvement in this premium translates to a deterioration in
the investment opportunity set faced by the unconstrained agent, causing them to reduce
consumption and pushing up their wealth/consumption ratios and, in turn, asset prices.
In addition to these first-order moments, the dynamics of the model are also affected
by the constraint. There is a reduction in trade when one agent is constrained. In this
region, shares are only exchanged in order to maintain the portfolio weight which holds the
constrained agent against their constraint. This reduction in exchange dampens volatility
as there is less change in the marginal agent pricing risky assets. This effect can be seen
in Figure 3(b). One take-away from this observation could be an intuition for volatility
frowns and smirks observed in options pricing data. Implied volatility can have a positive
or negative term premium for different values of the strike, implying changes in volatility
over the state space. What this model predicts is that for markets where participants face
constraints in their trade of the underlying, there will be a positive term premium (or frown),
while for unconstrained assets there will be a negative term premium (smirk or smile).
The effect on leverage is substantial given both a supply effect and a demand effect.
The demand for credit is artificially lower under constraint when risk neutral agents cannot
leverage up. The supply of credit is also reduced because risk averse agents shift wealth
into risky assets. They do so because they see low volatility and high expected returns.
Risk averse agents shift wealth into risky shares and the supply of credit contracts. As the
economy moves between the constrained and unconstrained regions the cyclicality of leverage
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(a) (b)
(c)
Fig. 3.
changes.
Leverage cycles are both pro- and counter-cyclical in both complete and incomplete
markets, but the dynamics of this cyclicality is vastly different under the two regimes. In
complete markets, the slope of leverage varies smoothly, moving from positive to negative
as one moves through the state space. Only in very bad states does leverage exhibit pro-
cyclicality, as risk averse agents begin to dominate and the interest rate becomes too high
for risk neutral agents to desire to borrow. This inflection point becomes a singularity
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under margin constraints. In Figure 1(d) we can see a kink at the boundary between the
constrained and unconstrained regions, implying a jump from pro- to counter-cyclicality.
This prediction connects to the large literature on the cyclicality of leverage (Geanakoplos
(1996, 2010); Adrian and Shin (2010b), as well as many others). These observations will be
studied empirically in section 4.
3.2. Three Types, Cascading Constraints, and Non-Monotonic Leverage Cy-
cles
Consider next the case of three agents6. Introducing a third agent shows how there can
exist a cascade effect. As the least risk-averse agent’s constraint binds, the other agents
begin to leverage up. This causes the agent in the middle of the distribution of preferences
to move towards their constraint. This is not evident with only two agents, as the most
risk-averse agent will never hit their constraint. The increase in leverage of the intermediate
agent actually leads to a full recovery of leverage. That is, in the region where the least risk-
averse agent is constrained, the intermediate agent will take their place in the market for
borrowing, partially or even fully offsetting the reduction in borrowing caused by constraint.
This leads to a sort of double-dip in leverage: first leverage contracts as one agent becomes
constrained, then rises as the intermediate agent takes up the slack, and eventually falls
when the intermediate agent also becomes constrained.
All parameters are the same as in section 3.1, except preferences which are set to
(γ1, γ2, γ3) = (1.1, 1.5, 3.0) and margin constraints are set to mi = 1.2 for all i. Graphs
are plotted over the state space where (ω1, ω2) ∈ {(x, y) ∈ R+ : x + y ≤ 1}, the two di-
mensional simplex. In the extreme cases where Dt → 0 or Dt → ∞, (ω1, ω2) → (0, 0) and
(ω1, ω2)→ (1, 0), respectively. Thus we can think of negative shocks pushing in a southwest
direction and positive shocks pushing in a southeast direction, with some deviation in the
interior of the state space7.
Consider first the interest rate and market price of risk, depicted in Figures 4 and 5.
These two variables determine the investment opportunity set, which makes them key in
determining asset prices. You’ll notice first that the interest rate is increasing under negative
shocks. This is similar to the complete market, where negative shocks push more weight to
the most risk averse agent who is very patient and in turn requires a higher interest rate.
However we can see that there is a region where the interest rate is lower in the constrained
equilibrium, evidenced by the negative values in Figure 4(b). In this region at least one agent
6For a description of the numerical solution to this problem see ?? B.
7Quiver plot of shock directions to be added.
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is constrained. There is a contraction in the demand for credit, pushing up the price of bonds
and down the interest rate. The market price of risk follows similar dynamics (Figure 5)
for similar reasons. However, the market price of risk is higher under constraint, as seen in
Figure 5(b). This is driven by risk-averse agents requiring higher returns to hold a greater
share of their wealth in risky assets. These effects combined have an ambiguous effect on
asset prices, a priori, but tend to increase asset prices for the given parameterization.
(a)
(b)
Fig. 4. Risk free rate in levels (Figure 4(a)) and in deviations from complete markets (??).
Asset prices are higher under constraint, as can be seen in Figure 6. This effect is similar
to that discussed in section 3.1. Because agents have EIS less than one, the income effect
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dominates and wealth consumption ratios increase, pushing up asset prices. Interestingly,
the deviation in asset prices is very steep near the boundary, driven by a rapid deterioration
in the equity risk premium (Figure 7). The equity risk premium is higher in the constrained
region to compensate risk-averse investors, but it falls quickly as the economy moves towards
the point (ω1, ω2) = (0, 0).
These changes in the investment opportunity set are driven by the constraint on portfo-
lios, which are represented in Figure 8. As you can see, agent 1 is constrained over a large
area of the state space. The portfolio weights of agents 2 and 3 are kinked at the interface
between regions where agent 1 is unconstrained and constrained. In the constrained region,
the portfolio weights of unconstrained agents are steeper and portfolio weights higher than
in the case of complete markets. This can be seen in Figure 9, which plots percentage de-
viations from the unconstrained equilibrium. Here we see that unconstrained agents hold
substantially more of their wealth in risky assets than they would have in the unconstrained
equilibrium. This pushes them closer to their constraint. As agent 1 becomes more and more
constrained, the investment opportunities of agent 2 improve, causing them to leverage up.
Eventually they run into their constraint, creating a sort of cascade. However this increase
in portfolio weights does not translate directly into an increase in leverage.
In the constrained region, leverage is weakly lower than in the unconstrained equilibrium
and exhibits non-monotonic and non-linear dynamics. Figure 10 shows leverage in both
levels and deviations from the unconstrained equilibrium. There are two peaks in leverage,
one along the boundary where agent 1 becomes constrained and another along the boundary
where agent 2 becomes constrained. In the intermediate region, leverage actually recovers
back to its unconstrained level, as you can see in Figure 10(b), indicated by the dark red
region for low values of ω1 and high values of ω2. This implies that, even though agent 1 is
constrained, agent two holds a sufficient amount of leverage to completely offset the reduc-
tion. At the same time, they do not hold more leverage than necessary to push the economy
back to the same amount of aggregate leverage that would prevail without constraint.
Finally, the volatility surface shows non-monotonic and non-linear dynamics. As we can
see in Figure 11, there is excess volatility above the fundamental volatility σD. However, the
constraint reduces this because of a reduction in risk sharing. We can think of the margin
constraint as pushing the economy towards the autarkical case, as individuals are unable to
trade freely. In the limit when there is no trade whatsoever, the volatility of the asset price
is simply the volatility of the underlying dividend. However, the constraint does not quite
push the economy to this point, as individuals still exchange in order to remain against their
constraint.
All of these observations point to several empirical tests, however the most apparent is
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that of leverage. We can see that the cyclicality of leverage is varying with other macroeco-
nomic variables. Using this observation we can think about a new way to consider leverage
cyclicality.
4. The Cyclicality of Leverage
Beliefs driven leverage cycles are pro-cyclical according to theory. This implication is
somewhat contradicted in several empirical studies, including Adrian and Shin (2010b). In
that paper the authors note that the leverage cycle is only pro-cyclical for a particular sector
of the economy, asset broker/dealers. However, those authors plot leverage as a function of
total assets, which produces a mechanical correlation. Consider the definition of financial
leverage:
Leverage =
Liabilities
NetWealth
=
Liabilities
Assets− Liabilities
Increases in balance sheet assets produce a negative correlation between leverage and as-
sets8(Ang et al. (2011)). Figure 12(a) plots the rate of growth in leverage against the rate
of growth in assets for all sectors over 1952Q1 to 2017Q1 as measured from the US Flow of
Funds. As you can see, there is a clear negative relationship.
Consider instead changes in GDP as a proxy for the business cycle. Figure 12(b) plots
the rate of growth in leverage for all sectors against the rate of growth in GDP over the same
period, again from U.S. Flow of Funds data. The previously clear negative relationship has
disappeared, implying the leverage cycle is ambiguous in this sense. However, this ambiguity
may simply be that there exists some other explanatory variable which drives the cyclicality
of leverage, in particular preference heterogeneity.
One proxy for preference heterogeneity is the price-dividend ratio. As we saw in section 2,
asset prices will be high relative to dividends and vice-versa when the marginal agent in the
economy is less risk averse. Figure 13(a) plots the growth rate in GDP against the price of
the S&P 500 divided by GDP (a measure of the price/dividend ratio of the total economy).
Indeed we see that there is substantial dispersion in this measure. The price/dividend ratio
bunches towards the origin as asset prices have been rising over time, but there is little
evidence for a clear positive or negative relationship with GDP growth. For this reason, we
8However, this makes the fact that Adrian and Shin (2010b) find pro-cyclical leverage cycles for bro-
ker/dealers all the more substantial of a finding
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Nonfinancial
Corporations
Nonfinancial
Private
Business
HH’s and
Nonprofits
All
Sectors
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Intercept −0.0042 −0.0078 −0.0103 −0.0046
(0.0618) (0.0610) (0.0599) (0.0590)
∆ln GDP 0.1034 0.2117** 0.2827*** 0.2397**
(0.0994) (0.0980) (0.0963) (0.0949)
S/D −0.0045 −0.0119 −0.0209 −0.2107**
(0.0874) (0.0862) (0.0846) (0.0834)
∆ln GDP ∗ S/D −0.1727 −0.2726** −0.3610*** −0.5157***
(0.1070) (0.1055) (0.1036) (0.1021)
Standard errors in parentheses.
∗ : p ≤ 0.1, ∗∗ : p ≤ 0.05, ∗∗∗ : p ≤ 0.01
Table 2: Regression results for dependent variable ∆ln Lev for different sectors of the econ-
omy. A positive and significant coefficient on ∆ln GDP implies procyclicality, while a nega-
tive and significant coefficient on the interaction with S/D implies counter-cyclicality when
the price dividend ratio is high. Note: Variables are normalized using z-score.
can consider the correlations between these variables, captured by the following regression:
∆ln Lev = α + β1∆ln GDP + β2∆ln GDP ∗ S
D
+ β3
S
D
The cyclicality of the leverage cycle is then captured by the slope with respect to the growth
rate in GDP, that is
∂∆ln GDP∆ln Lev = β1 + β2
S
D
The leverage cycle is pro- or counter-cyclical as this value is positive or negative, respectively
Table 2 reports the results for several specifications, studying different subsamples of the
economy.
The results imply that the cyclicality of leverage is not the same for all values of the
price-dividend ratio. Column 4 gives results for all sectors included in the US Flow of
Funds. Leverage growth is positively correlated with GDP growth when the price dividend
ratio is low. As asset prices rise the effect changes sign and the correlation becomes negative.
Changes in the price-dividend ratio imply changes in the preferences of the marginal agent
pricing risky assets. When the price-dividend ratio is low the marginal agent is risk averse,
while when the price-dividend ratio is high the marginal agent is more risk neutral. Thus
the leverage cycle is pro-cyclical when risk-averse agents dominate and counter-cyclical when
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Nonfinancial
Corporations
Nonfinancial
Private
Business
HH’s and
Nonprofits
All
Sectors
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Intercept 0.0170 0.0838 0.0948 0.0227
(0.0674) (0.0638) (0.0674) (0.0672)
∆ln GDP −0.5144*** −0.4412** −0.5330*** −0.9689***
(0.1907) (0.1808) (0.1908) (0.1904)
r 0.0164 −0.0847 0.0018 0.0549
(0.0789) (0.0748) (0.0790) (0.0788)
∆ln GDP ∗ r 0.4121** 0.4095** 0.5131*** 0.7603***
(0.1700) (0.1611) (0.1701) (0.1697)
Standard errors in parentheses.
∗ : p ≤ 0.1, ∗∗ : p ≤ 0.05, ∗∗∗ : p ≤ 0.01
Table 3: Regression results for dependent variable ∆ln Lev for different sectors of the econ-
omy. A negative and significant coefficient on ∆ln GDP implies counter-cyclicality, while a
positive and significant coefficient on the interaction with r implies pro-cyclicality when the
interest rate is high. As opposed to Table 2, r is high when the risk averse agent dominates,
exactly when the price-dividend ratio is low. Note: Variables are normalized using z-score.
risk-neutral agents dominate.
This result is fairly robust to other measures of marginal preferences. One problem
could be the heteroscedasticity exhibited by GDP growth over the price/dividend ratio in
Figure 13(a). Consider the risk free rate as a proxy for the marginal agent, which is plotted
in Figure 13(b) against GDP growth. In this case the dispersion of GDP growth is more
uniform over values of the interest rate. Define a similar set of regressions as before, i.e.:
∆ln Lev = α + β1∆ln GDP + β2∆ln GDP ∗ r + β3r
Again the cyclicality is captured by the slope with respect to the growth rate in GDP:
∂∆ln GDP∆ln Lev = β1 + β2r
In this case we should expect the sign to flip. The interest rate is high when the marginal
agent is risk-averse and low when the marginal agent is risk-neutral. Table 3 reports the
results. Leverage growth co-moves positively with GDP growth and the interest rate is high
and negatively when the interest rate is low. This result again implies that the cyclicality
of the leverage cycle depends in the same way as before on the preferences of the marginal
agent.
The regression results highlight how the cyclicality of the leverage cycle relates to financial
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variables and, in turn, preferences. Agents are likely to be constrained when asset prices are
low, producing a pro-cyclical leverage cycle. Agents will be far from their constraint when
asset prices are high, producing a counter-cyclical the leverage cycle. Asset price movements
are explained by changes in the marginal agent in the economy, as seen in section 2.
5. Conclusion
In this paper I’ve shown how one can solve a model of preference heterogeneity when
agents face convex portfolio constraints. The results show how preference heterogeneity and
constraint can lead not only to cascade effects, but also high asset prices, high returns, and
low interest rates. I also show how leverage cycles can be both pro- or counter-cyclical
depending on the underlying assumptions of preference heterogeneity and constraints. In
addition I’ve documented a new stylized fact predicted by the model, namely that leverage
is both pro- and counter-cyclical depending on the level of aggregate consumption. Future
work on this topic could introduce a stochastic endowment and more general preferences.
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(a)
(b)
Fig. 5. Market price of risk in levels (Figure 5(a)) and in deviations from complete markets
(Figure 5(b)).
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(a)
(b)
Fig. 6. Asset prices in levels (Figure 6(a)) and in deviations from complete markets (Fig-
ure 6(b)).
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(a)
(b)
Fig. 7. Asset prices in levels (Figure 7(a)) and in deviations from complete markets (Fig-
ure 7(b)).
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(a)
(b)
(c)
Fig. 8. Portfolio weights. On the left is a countour plot and the right a surface plot of the
same data. 34
(a)
(b)
(c)
Fig. 9. Portfolio weights in percentage deviations from complete markets.
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(a)
(b)
Fig. 10. Leverage in levels (Figure 10(a)) and in deviations from complete markets (Fig-
ure 10(b)).
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(a)
(b)
Fig. 11. Volatility in levels (Figure 11(a)) and in deviations from complete markets (Fig-
ure 11(b)).
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(a) (b)
Fig. 12. Growth rate in leverage plotted against the growth rate in assets (Figure 12(a)) and
against the growth rate in GDP (Figure 12(b)) for all sectors. Source: FRB Flow of Funds
Data.
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(a) (b)
Fig. 13. Growth rate in GDP plotted against the price/dividend ratio (Figure 13(a)), proxied
by the price of the S&P500 divided by GDP, and against the risk free rate (Figure 13(b)),
proxied by the yield on constant maturity 10-year treasuries. Source: FRB Flow of Funds
Data and FRED.
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Appendix A. Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. Take the market clearing condition in consumption and divide through
by agent i’s consumption
∑
j
cjt = Dt ⇔ cit = cit∑
j cjt
Dt =
 (eρtΛiHit)−1γi∑
j (e
ρtΛjHjt)
−1
γj
Dt = ωitDit
where ωit represents an individual’s consumption weight and is given by
ωit =
(eρtΛiHit)
−1
γi∑N
j=1 (e
ρtΛjHjt)
−1
γj
Assume individual consumption follows an Itoˆ process such that
dcit
cit
= µcitdt+ σcitdW (t) (18)
Apply Itoˆ’s lemma to Eq. (5) and solve for µcit and σcit
µcit =
rt − ρ+ δi(νit)
γi
+
1 + γi
γ2i
1
2
(
θt +
νit
σt
)2
, σci(t) =
1
γi
(
θ +
νit
σt
)
Apply Itoˆ’s lemma to the market clearing condition for consumption and match coefficients
to find
µD =
N∑
i=1
ωitµcit , σD =
N∑
i=1
ωitσcit
Now substitute the values for consumption drift and diffusion and solve for the interest rate
and the market price of risk:
θt =
1∑
i
ωit
γi
(
σD − 1
σt
∑
i
ωitνit
γi
)
rt =
1∑
i
ωit
γi
(
µD + ρ
∑
i
ωit
γi
−
∑
i
ωit
γi
δi(νit)− 1
2
∑
i
1 + γi
γi
(
θt +
νit
σt
)2
ωit
)
Proof of Proposition 2. Apply Itoˆ’s lemma to ωit =
cit
Dt
and match coefficients to find the
dynamics of consumption weights in Eq. (9) and Eq. (10).
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Proof of Propostions 3 and 4. Assume there exists a Markovian equilibrium in ωt = [ω1t, . . . , ω(N−1)t].
In the individual’s fictitious financial market, they solve the following optimization problem
Ji(t, x,ω) = max{cit,piit}∞u=t
E
∫ ∞
t
e−ρ(u−t)
c1−γiiu
1− γidu
s.t. dXit =
[
Xit
(
rt + +δi(νit) + piitσt
(
θ +
νit
σt
))
− cit
]
dt+XitpiitσtdWt
dωt = µωdt+ σωdWt
δi(νit) + νitpiit = 0
Xit = x , ωt = ω
Then an individual’s Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation writes9
0 = max
c,pi
{
e−ρt
c1−γi
1− γi +
∂Jit
∂t
+
[
X
(
rt + δi(νit) + piσt
(
θt +
νit
σt
))
− c
]
∂Jit
∂X
+
N−1∑
j=1
µωjtωjt
∂Jit
∂ωj
+ pi
N−1∑
j=1
σωjtσtωjX
∂2Jit
∂X∂ωj
+
N−1∑
j=1
∑
k<j
σωjtσωktωjωk
∂2Jit
∂ωj∂ωk
+
1
2
[
X2pi2σ2t
∂2Jit
∂X2
+
N−1∑
j=1
σ2ωjtω
2
j
∂2Jit
∂ω2j
]} (19)
subject to the transversality condition EtJit → 0 for all i. First order conditions imply
c =
(
eρt
∂Jit
∂X
)−1
γi
(20)
pi = −
(
Xσt
∂2Jit
∂X2
)−1 [(
θt +
νit
σt
)
∂Jit
∂X
+
N−1∑
j=1
σωjtωj
∂2Jit
∂X∂ωj
]
(21)
Assume that the value function is separable as
Ji(t, x,ω) = e
−ρtx
1−γiVi(ω)γi
1− γi (22)
9In the following, the t subscript denotes dependence on the state. For all values other than Jit, this
implies only ω.
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Substituting Eq. (22) into Eqs. (20) and (21) gives
c =
x
Vi(ω)
(23)
pi =
1
γiσt
(
θt +
νit
σt
+
γi
Vi(ω)
N−1∑
j=1
σωjtωj
∂Vi(ω)
∂ωj
+
)
(24)
which shows that Vi(ω) is the wealth-consumption ratio as a function of the vector of con-
sumption weights. Define ∇ as the gradient operator and use Eq. (11), then Eq. (24) rewrites
as
pi =
1
γiσt
(
θt +
νit
σt
+ γi
σTω∇Vi(ω)
Vi(ω)
)
as in Proposition 4. Next, substitute Eqs. (22) to (24) into Eq. (19) and simplify to find
0 =1 +
1
2
σTωHVi(ω)σω +
[
1− γi
γi
(
θt +
νit
σt
)
σTω + µ
T
ω
]
∇Vi(ω)
+
1
γi
[
(1− γi)(rt + δi(νit))− ρ+ 1− γi
2γi
(
θt +
νit
σt
)2]
Vi(ω)
(25)
Where µω and σω are as in Proposition 2, and where H represents the Hessian operator. The
boundary conditions are given by recognizing that the limits in ωi → {0, 1} is an economy
where agent i has zero weight, while the remaining agents determine prices.
Proof of Proposition 5. Define the price-dividend ratio as a function of consumption weights:
S(ω) = St = StDt . Taking the market clearing condition for wealth
St =
∑
i
Xit ⇔ St
Dt
=
∑
i
Xit
Dt
=
∑
i
Xit
cit
cit
Dt
=
∑
i
Vi(ω)ωi = S(ω)
To find volatility, apply Itoˆ’s lemma to Dt
∑
i Vi(ωt)ωit = St and match coefficients to find
the expression in Eq. (15).
Proof of Proposition 6. For a homogeneous margin constraint, νit ≤ 0 and m ≥ 0, thus
νitm ≤ 0 (Cvitanic´ and Karatzas (1992); Chabakauri (2015)). Additionally, piit ≤ m. Sub-
stituting the solution for piit from Eq. (14) into the latter inequality and recognizing that,
by the Kuhn-Tucker conditions at least one of the inequalities holds with equality gives the
result.
Proof of Claim 1. This proof shows that the present setting satisfies the assumptions neces-
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sary to apply Proposition 5.1 and Theorem 5.1 from Confortola et al. (2017), namely that
the problem admits a dynamic programming representation and that the solution (in the
viscosity sense) to the HJB in Eq. (19) is indeed the value function. The proof proceeds in
three steps: first the state is defined as a Markov diffusion, second the assumptions from
Confortola et al. (2017) are verified, and third the assumptions from Ishii (1989) are verified,
giving uniqueness of the viscosity solution.
Markovian Define Yt = [Xit, ω1t, . . . , ω(N−1)t]T ∈ R+ × ∆N−1 = X as the state vector of
an individual and αt = [cit, piit]
T ∈ R+ × Πi = A as the control vector. By Propostions 1
to 6 the state vector is Markovian and has controlled dynamics
dYt = b(Yt, αt)dt+ σ(Yt, αt)dWt
Bellman Principle and Existence of Viscosity Solution Define the felicity function
f(y, a) = ui(c) and notice that this is not a function of the state and only a function of one
of the controls. The following assumptions must be verified:
Assumption A.1. The dynamics of wealth, the dynamics of consumption weights, and the
utility function must be continuous.
Assumption A.2. The dynamics of wealth must be jointly Lipschitz continuous in the state
variable.
Assumption A.3. There must exist some constants M > 0 and r ≥ 0 such that
‖f(y, a)‖ ≤M(1 + ‖y‖r)
for all y ∈ RN and all a ∈ A.
Assumption A.4. ρ > ρ, where ρ = 0 if r from assumption A.3 is zero, otherwise if r > 0,
ρ > 0 is such that
E
[
sup
s∈[0,t]
‖Ys‖
]
≤ Ceρt(1 + |x|r)
for some constant C ≥ 0, with ρ and C independent of t, α, and x.
Assumption A.5. f(x, a) is continuous in x uniformly with respect to a.
Assumption A.5 is trivially satisfied as the utility function is not a function of the state, but
only of the control.
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Assumption A.3 is easily shown to be satisfied since the utility function is of power form:∣∣∣∣ c1−γi1− γi
∣∣∣∣ ≤M(1 + ‖y‖r)
taking r = 0 we have ∣∣∣∣ c1−γi2(1− γi)
∣∣∣∣ ≤M
which is satisfied in finite t by taking M ≥ maxt{Dt}1−γ/(2(1− γi)) in any finite t, thanks
to market clearing. In the limit when t→∞, we have Dt going to ∞, a.s. In this case, the
admissible set goes to a singleton.
Assumption A.4 is satisfied for all non-zero rates of time preference, given we took r = 0
above.
Assumption A.1 is satisfied for the utility function. For the dynamics of wealth, the func-
tions are continuous up to νi(·) and ∇Vi(·). If we assume that Vi(·) is once continuously
differentiable, then we satisfy assumption A.1.
Assumption A.2 Is satisfied if Vi(·) has bounded first derivative.
Uniqueness of Viscosity Solution (To be completed) Outline of proof: according to
Ishii (1989), if the PDE given in Eq. (12) is uniform elliptic, if sub- and super-solutions have
exponential growth, and under the above assumptions on continuity of the dynamics of the
state, then the viscosity solution is unique.
Appendix B. Numerical Method
In this appendix I discuss the numerical solution of the problem of three preference
types under margin constraints. This problem has several difficult features which make it
challenging from a numerical perspective. First, the system of PDE’s in ?? represents a
highly non-linear system, as the coefficients depend in a non-trivial way on the solution, as
well as on the Jacobian. In addition, the coefficients are not smooth at the point where
the constraint binds. Finally, the state space is the 2 dimensional simplex, making finite
difference tedious.
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B.1. The Discretized State Space
Consider first the state space when N = 3. In this case ω ∈ {x ∈ [0, 1]2 | ‖x‖ ≤ 1}.
Figure 14(a) plots this space as the shaded region, simply the lower triangle of the [0, 1]
square in the first quandrant. To solve the PDE with finite difference we must discretize this
(a) (b)
Fig. 14. The two dimensional standard simplex (Figure 14(a)) and its discretized version
(Figure 14(b)) with K = 10 points along each axis. Black points are interior points and
white points are boundary points
space. I take the convention of specifying a discretization by the number K of points along
each axis. Figure 14(b) gives an example of such a discretization when K = 10. If we define
L as the number of points in the state space we have L = K ∗ (K + 1)/2 points. Notice
that along each edge of the simplex we have boundary conditions, so the number of interior
points is (K − 1)(K − 1)/2.
B.2. Boundary Vertices
The boundary conditions in the state space are very non-trivial. At each extreme point
in the simplex, a single agent dominates. That is
(ω1, ω2) = (1, 0)⇒ Agent 1 dominates.
(ω1, ω2) = (0, 1)⇒ Agent 2 dominates.
(ω1, ω2) = (0, 0)⇒ Agent 3 dominates.
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For each ωvj in this set of vertices (subscript denotes vertex with dominant agent j), the
dominant agent’s price dominates. We have the following aggregate variables
θ(ωvj) = σDγj
r(ωvj) = ρ+ µDγj − γj(1 + γj)σ
2
D
2
σ(ωvj) = σD
In addition, individuals may be constrained on the vertices. It can be shown that their
adjustments satisfy
νi(ωvj) = min
{
0, (miγi − γj)σ2D
}
Finally, the wealth/consumption ratios on these vertices are given by
Vi(ωvj) =
γi
ρ− (1− γi)
(
(σD+νi(ωvj)/σD)
2
2γi
+ r(ωvj)−miνi(ωvj)
)
B.3. Boundary Edges
Along a boundary edge, we are in a case where one agent has zero consumption weight
and the other two agents have weight that varies. There are three cases:
(ω1, ω2) ∈ {(x, y) | x ∈ [0, 1], y = 0}
(ω1, ω2) ∈ {(x, y) | x = 0, y ∈ [0, 1]}
(ω1, ω2) ∈ {(x, y) ∈ [0, 1]2 | x+ y = 1}
If we take the state variable to be the consumption weight of the individual with the lowest
index j and who has non-zero weight along the edge, the PDEs become ODEs:
1
γi
[
(1− γi)(r(ωj)−miνi(ωj))− ρ+ 1− γi
2γi
(
θ(ωj) +
νi(ωj)
σ(ωj)
)2]
Vi(ωj)+[
1− γi
γi
(
θ(ωj) +
νi(ωj)
σ(ωj)
)
σωjωj + µωjωj
]
V ′i (ωj) +
1
2
σ2ωjV
′′
i (ωj) + 1 = 0
(26)
The vertex values in section B.2 give boundary conditions for solving the two agent problem.
Already this ODE problem is highly non-linear. To solve it I use an implicit scheme and
Picard iteration. For the implicit method, we can add a time derivative term and consider
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the long run level of the wealth/consumption ratio to be ∆t, the length of the discrete time
step. Discretize the state space along the edge into P points ωpj = j/P ∀ j ∈ {1, . . . , P}.
Denote Vi(t, ω
p
j ) as V
t,p
i . In addition, define the coefficients in section B.3 such that
∂tV
t,p
i + ai(ω
p
j ,V
t,p)V t,pi + b(ω
p
j ,V
t,p)∂ωV
t,p
i + c(ω
p
j ,V
t,p)∂2ωωV
t,p
i + 1 = 0
To carry out Picard iteration, initialize the solution at the terminal value, then evaluate the
coefficients using the current solution guess and treat the derivatives as unknowns. Using
the following second-order-accurate central difference schemes:
∂tV
t,p
i ≈
V t+1,pi − V t,pi
∆t
∂ωV
t,p
i ≈
V t,p+1i − V t,p−1i
2h
∂2ωωV
t,p
i ≈
V t,p+1i − 2V t,pi + V t,p−1i
h2
where h = 1/P , and using a similar superscripting scheme for the coefficients, the discretized
scheme can be rearranged as[
ct+1,p
h2
− b
t+1,p
2h
]
V t,p−1i +
[
at+1,p − 2c
t+1,p
h2
− 1
∆t
]
V t,p−1i +
[
ct+1,p
h2
+
bt+1,p
2h
]
V t,p−1i
= −
[
1 +
V t+1,pi
∆t
]
This system of linear equations can be written as
Ax = b
where A is tridiagonal. At each time step this system is solved and the algorithm stops
when two consecutive steps are sufficiently close. An example of a solution to the two agent
problem is given in ??
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B.4. Full State Space
Given the numerical solution in sections B.2 and B.3, we have boundary values and can
now turn to the full PDE. For two agents the PDE in Proposition 3 becomes
1
γi
[
(1− γi)(r(ω) + δi(νi(ω)))− ρ+ 1− γi
2γi
(
θ(ω) +
νi(ω)
σ(ω)
)2]
Vi(ω)+[
1− γi
γi
(
θ(ω) +
νi(ω)
σ(ω)
)
σω1(ω)ω1 + µω1(ω)ω1
]
∂ω1Vi(ω)+[
1− γi
γi
(
θ(ω) +
νi(ω)
σ(ω)
)
σω2(ω)ω2 + µω2(ω)ω2
]
∂ω2Vi(ω)+
1
2
[
σ2ω1ω
2
1∂
2
ω1ω1
Vi(ω) + σ
2
ω2ω
2
2∂
2
ω2ω2
Vi(ω) + 2σω1σω2ω1ω2∂
2
ω1ω2
Vi(ω)
]
+ 1 = 0
(27)
As stated in section B.1, we discretize each edge into K points, giving a total of K(K+ 1)/2
points in the state space. If we denote ωjk = [ωj1, ω
k
2 ]
T the (j, k)’th point in the state space
and if we use a similar superscripting scheme as in section B.3, we can use the following set
of second-order-accurate central difference schemes:
∂tV
t,j,k
i ≈
V t+1,j,ki − V t,j,ki
∆t
∂ω1V
t,j,k
i ≈
V t,j+1,ki − V t,j−1,ki
2h
∂ω2V
t,j,k
i ≈
V t,j,k+1i − V t,j,k−1i
2h
∂2ω1ω1V
t,j,k
i ≈
V t,j+1,ki − 2V t,j,ki + V t,j−1,ki
h2
∂2ω2ω2V
t,j,k
i ≈
V t,j,k+1i − 2V t,j,ki + V t,j,k−1i
h2
∂2ω1ω2V
t,j,k
i ≈
V t,j+1,k+1i − V t,j−1,k+1i − V t,j+1,k−1i + V t,j−1,k−1i
4h2
If in addition we use the same Picard iteration scheme, we can discretize the equation as
at+1,j,ki,1 V
t,j,k
i + a
t+1,j,k
i,2 V
t,j+1,k
i + a
t+1,j,k
i,3 V
t,j−1,k
i + a
t+1,j,k
i,4 V
t,j,k+1
i + a
t+1,j,k
i,5 V
t,j,k−1
i +
at+1,j,ki,6 V
t,j+1,k+1
i + a
t+1,j,k
i,7 V
t,j+1,k−1
i + a
t+1,j,k
i,8 V
t,j−1,k+1
i + a
t+1,j,k
i,9 V
t,j−1,k−1
i = b
t+1,j,k
i
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where the coefficients are given by
at,j,ki,1 =
1
γi
(1− γi)(rt+1,j,k −miνt+1,j,ki )− ρ+ 1− γi2γi
(
θt+1,j,k +
νt+1,j,ki
σt+1,j,k
)2
− (σ
t+1,j,k
ω1 ω
j,k
1 )
2
h2
− (σ
t+1,j,k
ω2 ω
j,k
2 )
2
h2
− 1
∆t
at,j,ki,2 =
(σt+1,j,kω1 ω
j,k
1 )
2
2h2
+
1
2h
[
1− γi
γi
(
θt+1,j,k +
νt+1,j,ki
σt+1,j,k
)
σt+1,j,kω1 ω
j,k
1 + µ
t+1,j,k
ω1 ω
j,k
1
]
at,j,ki,3 =
(σt+1,j,kω1 ω
j,k
1 )
2
2h2
− 1
2h
[
1− γi
γi
(
θt+1,j,k +
νt+1,j,ki
σt+1,j,k
)
σt+1,j,kω1 ω
j,k
1 + µ
t+1,j,k
ω1 ω
j,k
1
]
at,j,ki,4 =
(σt+1,j,kω2 ω
j,k
2 )
2
2h2
+
1
2h
[
1− γi
γi
(
θt+1,j,k +
νt+1,j,ki
σt+1,j,k
)
σt+1,j,kω2 ω
j,k
2 + µ
t+1,j,k
ω2 ω
j,k
2
]
at,j,ki,5 =
(σt+1,j,kω2 ω
j,k
2 )
2
2h2
− 1
2h
[
1− γi
γi
(
θt+1,j,k +
νt+1,j,ki
σt+1,j,k
)
σt+1,j,kω2 ω
j,k
2 + µ
t+1,j,k
ω2 ω
j,k
2
]
at,j,ki,6 =
σt+1,j,kω1 σ
t+1,j,k
ω2 ω
j,k
1 ω
j,k
2
4h2
at,j,ki,7 = −
σt+1,j,kω1 σ
t+1,j,k
ω2 ω
j,k
1 ω
j,k
2
4h2
at,j,ki,8 = −
σt+1,j,kω1 σ
t+1,j,k
ω2 ω
j,k
1 ω
j,k
2
4h2
at,j,ki,9 =
σt+1,j,kω1 σ
t+1,j,k
ω2 ω
j,k
1 ω
j,k
2
4h2
bt,j,ki = −1−
V t+1,j,ki
∆t
B.5. The Diagonal Boundary
One issue is that across the diagonal boundary the finite difference approximation will
reach beyond the state space. To deal with this issue, we can define an additional set of
boundary points along the diagonal boundary and use a special finite difference scheme
to approximate this cross partial. Since ∂2xyf(x, y) = ∂x(∂yf(x, y)), we can use a central
difference in one direction and a backward difference in the other. This will allow us to avoid
crossing the boundary. This approximation is given by
∂2xyf(x, y) ≈
1
2h2
[fx,y+h − fx−h,y+h − fx,y−h + fx−h,y−h] (28)
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Fig. 15. WhenK = 4 we have the minimum number of points to have an interior point. When
we attempt to approximate the cross partial at this point the finite difference approximation
attempts to reach across the diagonal (curved arrow). To deal with this we can introduce a
particular difference approximation (Eq. (28)), which instead makes use of the points which
exist in the state space (straight arrows).
Using this discretization for the cross-partial at the diagonal boundary, we have the following
discretization at each index (j,K−j): If in addition we use the same Picard iteration scheme,
we can discretize the equation as
a˜t+1,j,K−ji,1 V
t,j,K−j
i + a˜
t+1,j,K−j
i,2 V
t,j+1,K−j
i + a˜
t+1,j,K−j
i,3 V
t,j−1,K−j
i + a˜
t+1,j,K−j
i,4 V
t,j,K−j+1
i
+ a˜t+1,j,K−ji,5 V
t,j,K−j−1
i + a˜
t+1,j,K−j
i,6 V
t,j−1,K−j−1
i + a˜
t+1,j,K−j
i,7 V
t,j−1,K−j+1
i = b
t+1,j,k
i
50
where the coefficients are given by
a˜t,j,K−ji,1 =
1
γi
(1− γi)(rt+1,j,K−j −miνt+1,j,K−ji )− ρ+ 1− γi2γi
(
θt+1,j,K−j +
νt+1,j,K−ji
σt+1,j,K−j
)2
− (σ
t+1,j,K−j
ω1 ω
j,K−j
1 )
2
h2
− (σ
t+1,j,K−j
ω2 ω
j,K−j
2 )
2
h2
− 1
∆t
= at,j,K−ji,1
a˜t,j,K−ji,2 =
1
2h
[
1− γi
γi
(
θt+1,j,K−j +
νt+1,j,K−ji
σt+1,j,K−j
)
σt+1,j,K−jω1 ω
j,K−j
1 + µ
t+1,j,K−j
ω1 ω
j,K−j
1
]
+
(σt+1,j,K−jω1 ω
j,K−j
1 )
2
h2
= at,j,K−ji,2
a˜t,j,K−ji,3 =
(σt+1,j,K−jω1 ω
j,K−j
1 )
2
2h2
− 1
2h
[
1− γi
γi
(
θt+1,j,K−j +
νt+1,j,K−ji
σt+1,j,K−j
)
σt+1,j,K−jω1 ω
j,K−j
1 + µ
t+1,j,K−j
ω1 ω
j,K−j
1
]
= at,j,K−ji,3
a˜t,j,K−ji,4 =
1
2h
[
1− γi
γi
(
θt+1,j,K−j +
νt+1,j,K−ji
σt+1,j,K−j
)
σt+1,j,K−jω2 ω
j,K−j
2 + µ
t+1,j,K−j
ω2 ω
j,K−j
2
]
+
(σt+1,j,K−jω2 ω
j,K−j
2 )
2
h2
+
σt+1,j,K−jω1 σ
t+1,j,K−j
ω2 ω
j,K−j
1 ω
j,K−j
2
2h2
= at,j,K−ji,4 + 2a
t,j,K−j
i,6
a˜t,j,K−ji,5 =
(σt+1,j,K−jω2 ω
j,K−j
2 )
2
h2
− σ
t+1,j,K−j
ω1 σ
t+1,j,K−j
ω2 ω
j,K−j
1 ω
j,K−j
2
2h2
− 1
2h
[
1− γi
γi
(
θt+1,j,K−j +
νt+1,j,K−ji
σt+1,j,K−j
)
σt+1,j,K−jω2 ω
j,K−j
2 + µ
t+1,j,K−j
ω2 ω
j,K−j
2
]
= at,j,K−ji,5 − 2at,j,K−ji,6
a˜t,j,K−ji,6 =
σt+1,j,K−jω1 σ
t+1,j,K−j
ω2 ω
j,K−j
1 ω
j,K−j
2
2h2
= 2at,j,K−ji,6
a˜t,j,K−ji,7 = −a˜t,j,K−ji,6 = 2at,j,K−ji,7
bt,j,K−ji = −1−
V t+1,j,ki
∆t
where the constant is much larger because points where j + k = K + 1 are boundary points.
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B.6. Linear Equations and Sparsity Pattern
As in the two agent case we again have a system of linear equations given by
Ax = b
However, now A is block tri-diagonal and exhibits a special sparsity pattern. Because each
subsecquent row or column in the state space is one point shorter, the blocks of A are
shrinking in size. As one rolls across columns, one also encounters boundary conditions. To
give you an idea of the shape of A, here is the upper left corner of the matrix(if j corresponds
to rows and k to columns of A, implying a C-style ordering of the points in the state space)
at+1,1,1i,1 a
t+1,1,1
i,2 0 . . . . . . a
t+1,1,1
i,4 a
t+1,1,1
i,6 0 . . . . . .
at+1,1,1i,3 a
t+1,1,1
i,1 a
t+1,1,1
i,2 0 . . . a
t+1,1,1
i,8 a
t+1,1,1
i,4 a
t+1,1,1
i,6 0 . . .
0
. . . . . . . . . . . . 0
. . . . . . . . . . . .
0 . . . at+1,K−2,1i,3 a
t+1,K−2,1
i,1 a
t+1,K−2,1
i,2 0 . . . a
t+1,K−2,1
i,8 a
t+1,K−2,1
i,4
0 . . . 0 at+1,K−1,1i,3 a
t+1,K−1,1
i,1 0 . . . . . . a
t+1,K−1,1
i,8
at+1,1,2i,5 a
t+1,1,2
i,7 0 . . . . . . a
t+1,1,2
i,1 a
t+1,1,2
i,2 0 . . . a
t+1,1,2
i,4
at+1,2,2i,9 a
t+1,2,2
i,5 a
t+1,2,2
i,7 0 . . . a
t+1,2,2
i,3 a
t+1,2,2
i,1 a
t+1,2,2
i,2 0 . . .
0
. . . . . . . . . . . . 0
. . . . . . . . . . . .
... at+1,K−3,2i,9 a
t+1,K−3,2
i,5 a
t+1,K−3,2
i,7 0 . . . a
t+1,K−3,2
i,3 a
t+1,K−3,2
i,1 a
t+1,K−3,2
i,2
... 0 at+1,K−2,2i,9 a
t+1,K−2,2
i,5 a
t+1,K−2,2
i,7 . . . . . . a
t+1,K−3,2
i,3 a
t+1,K−3,2
i,1
0
. . . . . . . . . . . . at+1,1,3i,5 a
t+1,1,3
i,7
. . . . . . . . .

The dotted lines represent moves from one column of the state space to another. You can
see that the diagonal blocks have a semetric sparsity pattern, while the off diagonal blocks
do not. Moving down a column of blocks, each block is one row smaller. This pattern can
be seen more clearly in Figure 16.
B.7. Computing Adjustments
The final detail to be taken care of is how to compute the coefficients. The adjustments
{νit}i satisfy a system of non-linear equations. In addition, conditional on knowledge of V
and JV , one must simultaneously solve for volatility. Thus, on each iteration, given a solution
V t,j,k, compute the price dividend ratio St,j,k, then gather the equations for adjustments in
Proposition 6 and for volatility in Proposition 5. Using a numerical solver, look for a root of
this system of N + 1 equations. Currently I am using the Scipy optimization module’s root
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Fig. 16. Sparsity pattern for the A matrix in generated by the finite difference discretization
of the PDE for three agents when the number of points on each axis is K = 10.
function and the ”hybrid” algorithm, an implimentation of the Minpack ”hybrd” function,
which uses a modified Powell method.
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